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A Search by Any Other Name: Fourth Amendment Implications
of a Private Citizen's Actions in State v. Sanders
A brutal murder was committed in a rural county in western North Caro-
lina in 1981.1 A seventeen-year-old girl was raped and murdered near her home.
Although the local sheriff's department investigator, Hubert Brown, suspected
Stanley Sanders, 2 he lacked sufficient proof to secure a warrant to search
Sander's home.3 When a private citizen named Curtis Gardin volunteered his
help, Brown provided him with detailed information regarding the case and
asked for his assistance in locating important evidence including a topaz ring
and gold watch. Following his conversations with the officer Gardin entered the
defendant's home and discovered and removed the evidence. Brown used the
evidence to secure a search warrant. Sheriff's deputies arrested the defendant
during the subsequent search; he confessed to the murder.4 A few months later
Sanders was convicted of the crime and sentenced to death. The primary issue
on appeal was whether the search conducted by the informant Gardin consti-
tuted a violation of the defendant's fourth amendment rights:
The effect of the 4th Amendment is to put the courts of the
United States and Federal officials, in the exercise of their power and
authority, under limitations and restraints as to the exercise of such
power .... This protection reaches all alike, whether accused of crime
or not .... The tendency of those who execute the criminal laws of
the country to obtain conviction by means of unlawful seizures...
should find no sanction in the judgments of the courts which are
charged at all times with the support of the Constitution.5
The strictures of the fourth amendment apply only to searches and seizures
effected by the government in its sovereign capacity.6 Much controversy sur-
rounding the fourth amendment arises from the manner in which courts enforce
the amendment's prohibitions against law enforcement authorities. By applying
the exclusionary rule, courts prevent prosecutors from employing unconstitu-
tionally obtained evidence. In weighing the merits of a motion to suppress evi-
dence derived from an alleged violation of the fourth amendment, a court faces
the grim irony that despite the existence of damning evidence in hand, its ruling
might set the accused party free. The fourth amendment is often the so-called
1. Transylvania County, North Carolina has a population of approximately 23,000; 77% of its
residents live in rural areas. See generally THE NORTH CAROLINA ALMANAC 244 (J. Crutchfield
ed. 1986) (population figures based on the 1980 census).
2. Sanders was a borderline mental retardant with an Intelligence Quotient of 73. Defendant-
Appellant's Brief at 17, State v. Sanders, 327 N.C. 319, 395 S.E.2d 412 (1990) (No. 88A85).
3. Sanders, 327 N.C. at 328, 395 S.E.2d at 419.
4. Id. at 324-35, 395 S.E.2d at 416-17.
5. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 391-92 (1914).
6. Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1920). The heart of the fourth amendment is the
recognition that citizens have a right to be free from arbitrary exercises of governmental authority.
The writ of assistance, used by British customs officials before the Revolutionary War to search for
contraband, was one of the sources of controversy that gave rise to the fourth amendment. See W.
LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 1.1(a), at 4 (2d ed. 1987).
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"technicality" that victims' rights groups vilify in their battle cry: "He got off
on a technicality!"'7
Because the fourth amendment applies only to governmental intrusions, a
search or seizure by a private citizen generally is not constitutionally pro-
scribed. 8 It is often unclear, however, whether a search conducted by someone
other than a duly appointed officer of the law is "private." When the police
encourage a private citizen to aid in the enforcement of the law, the citizen often
conducts a search. A court faced with such a situation must decide if the rela-
tionship between the citizen and the police rises to the level of agency. If it does,
the court must subject the search to fourth amendment scrutiny and the evi-
dence thus obtained to exclusionary rule limitations if a constitutional violation
is found. It was against this backdrop that the North Carolina Supreme Court
considered the case of State v. Sanders.9
The defendant in Sanders argued that the informant acted as an agent of
the state when he seized the evidence that led to Sander's conviction.' 0 Since
the authorities lacked probable cause or a warrant for the search and seizure, if
an agency relationship existed and the fourth amendment was triggered, the ex-
clusionary rule would apply." The North Carolina Supreme Court unani-
mously rejected this argument and held that the informant's actions constituted
a private search. It thus upheld the defendant's conviction of first-degree mur-
der, which had been based on evidence seized during the search.
This Note analyzes the Sanders court's reasoning in finding a private
search. By focusing on the citizen's motive for conducting the search and the
7. The United States Supreme Court has acknowledged that when application of the exclu-
sionary rule leads to criminals going free, it may generate disrespect for the law. Thus the rule
should be applied only when the remedial objective of deterrence will be significant. United States v.
Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 908-09 (1984). Judge Cardozo distilled this quandary in the phrase: "The
criminal is to go free because the constable has blundered." People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21, 150
N.E. 585, 587 (1926). For further discussion of the "technicality" question, see infra note 112 and
accompanying text.
8. Burdeau, 256 U.S. at 475.
9. 327 N.C. 319, 395 S.E.2d 412 (1990).
10. Id. at 331, 395 S.E.2d at 420.
11. The constitutionality of the manner in which the police procured the evidence-the watch
and ring-was significant in Sanders. Because these items allegedly were stolen from the victim's
home on the night of the murder, they provided the authorities with probable cause to arrest the
defendant. Id. at 338, 395 S.E.2d at 425. Had the court found the watch and ring to be the fruits of
an illegal search, the arrest might have been illegal, and the confession obtained pursuant to that
arrest might have been subject to the exclusionary rule. Assuming an illegal arrest, exclusion of a
resulting confession turns on whether the confession was "obtained by exploitation of the illegality of
[the defendant's] arrest." Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 600 (1975). The Brown Court identified
three considerations to determine whether the confession should be suppressed: "[t]he temporal
proximity of the arrest and confession, the presence of intervening circumstances, and, in particular,
the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct." Id. at 603-04 (citations omitted).
In Sanders the arrest and subsequent confession took place on the same day under a continuous
chain of custody. Furthermore, the defendant was arrested while the police were searching his home
under a warrant obtained with a false affidavit. See infra note 19. The burden to show admissibility
of such a confession rests on the prosecution. Brown, 422 U.S. at 604. In Sanders the prosecution,
noting that the police had displayed the illegally seized evidence during the interrogation, virtually
conceded that the confession would be tainted if those fruits of the private citizen's search were
illegally obtained. Supplemental Brief for the State at 7, Sanders (No. 88A85). See generally W.
RINGEL, SEARCHES & SEIZURES, ARRESTS & CONFESSIONS § 30.4, at 30-19 (2d ed. 1990) (discuss-
ing when a confession obtained pursuant to an illegal arrest should be excluded).
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nature of the governmental acquiescence or knowledge, the supreme court fol-
lowed the analysis laid down by other state and federal courts. What the Sand-
ers court defined as a private search, however, is broader than the precedent on
which the court relied. The use of informants to conduct private searches could
become a device by which frustrated law enforcement authorities satisfy hunches
and develop probable cause. The Note concludes that courts would better serve
the dictates of the fourth amendment if the relevant inquiry were whether the
police reasonably should have foreseen that their actions would lead to a private
citizen conducting a search that they themselves constitutionally could not un-
dertake. By focusing on identifiable behavior, an objective test for agency would
better serve the deterrent purposes of the exclusionary rule.
The trial court in Sanders found that the informant, Gardin, voluntarily
had approached investigator Brown of the Transylvania County Sheriff's De-
partment and offered his help.1 2 His initial motivation was a desire to relieve the
"grief of the family" and "do what was just."'1 3 Brown confirmed to Gardin
that the defendant was his suspect in the murder. He told Gardin how he
thought the murder had occurred, and said that he "needed only a little more
information to conclude the investigation with the defendant's arrest."1' 4 Brown
showed Gardin sketches of a watch and a topaz ring that he sought, and asked
"if he could get into [the defendant's] home to see if the jewelry was there."' 5
He instructed Gardin "to 'go into the community and see what you can de-
velop.' "16 Brown also instructed Gardin to look for other evidence "if nothing
was found at the defendant's home."'17 Brown offered reward money but Gardin
denied interest in it.
Gardin, under the code name "Blueboy," phoned Brown and told him of a
plan to gain entry into the defendant's home.18 There was no evidence that
Brown approved or disapproved the plan. Gardin followed through on this plan
but uncovered no evidence. On the following day he returned and spoke with
the defendant's sister. Gardin told her that something had been stolen from a
friend of his, that her brother was suspected, and that if she would help him find
it his friend would not bring charges. She showed Gardin to the defendant's
bedroom and the two of them discovered a box in which Gardin found the
12. Sanders, 327 N.C. at 328, 321 S.E.2d at 418. The superior court found these facts on
remand from the supreme court. The State tried Sanders twice for this crime. Following the first
conviction in 1982, the supreme court ordered a new trial because the trial transcript was unintel-
ligible and the court was therefore unable to review the record on appeal. State v. Sanders, 312 N.C.
318, 320, 321 S.E.2d 836, 837 (1984). The defendant renewed his motion to suppress before the
second trial, offering the informant's testimony about the seizure. The court held that the ruling in
the first trial denying the motion was the "law of the case," and declined to hear further testimony.
Sanders, 327 N.C. at 327, 395 S.E.2d at 418. On the first appeal from the second trial, the supreme
court remanded for the sole purpose of hearing all witnesses offering competent testimony on the
motion to suppress. The findings of fact in this discussion are taken from that proceeding.
13. Sanders, 327 N.C. at 328, 395 S.E.2d at 418.




18. Gardin planned to go to the home while the defendant was away and ask his mother for an
old recipe. Id.
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watch and ring that Brown had described. He took the two items and gave them
to Brown.
Brown then swore out an affidavit asserting that he had probable cause to
believe that these two pieces of evidence were at the defendant's home and the
magistrate issued a search warrant. 19 The Sheriff's department inventory listed
the watch and ring as items seized pursuant to this warrant. Three days after his
initial search at the defendant's home, Brown paid Gardin one thousand dol-
lars.20 The lower court concluded that Gardin did not act as an agent of the
state.
The supreme court reviewed the trial court's conclusion.2 1 Observing that
the fourth amendment applies to a search only "if the private party 'in light of
all the circumstances of the case must be regarded as having acted as an "instru-
ment" or agent of the State,' "22 the Sanders court noted that some courts have
applied a two-part test to determine if the facts rise to the level of a governmen-
tal search. These jurisdictions ask: "(1) whether the government instigated, par-
ticipated, or acquiesced in the citizen's conduct; and (2) whether the citizen
engaged in the search with the intent to further law enforcement efforts." '23
Before analyzing the facts of the case before it, the court reviewed a number
of cases in an attempt to clarify the existence of an agency relationship. The
19. Deputy Brown misrepresented the facts in this affidavit in two ways. At the time he sought
the warrant, the watch and ring were in his possession, not at the defendant's home. He also swore
that "a reliable informant who has proven reliable in the past and given me information which
resulted in the arrest and convictions of person [sic] involved in other felony cases" had provided the
information for the warrant. Record at 6, Sanders (No. 88A85). Gardin had not been an informant
prior to this case. Sanders, 327 N.C. at 330, 395 S.E.2d at 420. The trial court suppressed the
evidence obtained pursuant to this warrant. Id.
20. Sanders, 327 N.C. at 329, 395 S.E.2d at 419. The Sheriff's Department eventually paid
Gardin over seven thousand dollars for his assistance in the case. The supreme court noted that he
accepted the money in part because he believed that the black community had ostracized him. Id. at
329 n.4, 395 S.E.2d at 419 n.4.
21. Id. at 329, 395 S.E.2d at 419. The defendant asserted six other grounds for reversal in this
appeal. First, he alleged at both trials that Brown had given false and misleading testimony regard-
ing how he obtained evidence. While acknowledging this fact, the court held the testimony was not
material. Id. at 337, 395 S.E.2d at 424. Second, Sanders maintained that since the lower court had
determined on rehearing that the additional evidence seized when the home was searched pursuant
to the warrant should have been excluded, a new trial was required. The supreme court held that
this evidence was cumulative and its admission was harmless error. Id. at 338, 395 S.E.2d at 425.
Third, the defendant argued that his arrest was illegal because the arresting officers lacked probable
cause, and that his confession therefore should have been suppressed. The court held that this argu-
ment failed as well. Id. at 339-40, 395 S.E.2d at 425-26; see also supra note 11 (discussing exclusion
of confessions obtained pursuant to illegal arrests). Fourth, the defendant appealed from the lower
court's refusal to hear his fifth alibi witness. The court held that the defendant's failure to include
the witness on his master list justified the trial judge's discretionary decision to exclude him. Sand-
ers, 327 N.C. at 341, 395 S.E.2d at 426. Fifth, the court dismissed the defendant's contention that
the conduct of the prosecutor in closing arguments was grossly improper. Id. at 342-43, 395 S.E.2d
at 427. On the defendant's sixth ground for appeal, the court held that the death sentence handed
down by the jury under pattern instructions constituted a violation of the eighth and fourteenth
amendments of the federal Constitution under the holding of McKoy v. North Carolina, 110 S. Ct.
1227, 1234 (1990). Sanders, 327 N.C. at 344, 395 S.E.2d at 428. Thus, the supreme court upheld the
determination of guilt, but remanded the case for a new sentencing proceeding. Id. at 345, 395
S.E.2d at 429.
22. Sanders, 327 N.C. at 332, 395 S.E.2d at 421 (citing State v. Kornegay, 313 N.C. 1, 10, 326
S.E.2d 881, 890 (1985) (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 487 (1971))).
23. Id. (emphasis added).
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court began by discussing cases in which the search was held to be "private" and
the evidence admissible.2 4 The opinion referred briefly to an example in which
the citizen's motivation was "private."125 The court then cited a number of cases
in which police encouragement was found insufficient to examine the searches
under the fourth amendment.26 Finally, the opinion cited cases in which the
citizen's actions went beyond a private gearch, with the result that courts in-
voked the exclusionary rule to suppress the evidence.27 Having surveyed both
tiers of the private search test, the court concluded that "[the] determin[ation ofi
whether a private citizen's search or seizure is attributable to the State and
therefore subject to constitutional scrutiny demands a totality of the circum-
stances inquiry."'28
Although this language is analogous to that employed by the United States
Supreme Court in Coolidge v. New Hampshire,29 the North Carolina Supreme
Court added a third criterion to the two-part test established by other jurisdic-
24. Id.
25. Id. at 332-33, 395 S.E.2d at 421 (citing State v. Peele, 16 N.C. App. 227,230, 192 S.E.2d 67,
70 (crime victim conducted search to recover his own property), cert denied, 282 N.C. 429, 192
S.E.2d 838 (1972)).
26. Id. at 333, 395 S.E.2d at 421. The three cases the court cited for this proposition are
distinguishable from Sanders on their facts. In each, the citizen had first notified the authorities of
the crime and subsequently conducted a search. United States v. Snowadski, 723 F.2d 1427, 1428
(9th Cir. 1984) (co-worker of defendant contacted IRS and reported that defendant was selling used
aircraft engine cores and not reporting income); United States v. Miller, 688 F.2d 652, 655 (9th Cir.
1982) (victim of trailer theft contacted FBI, saying that he had received an anonymous tip that the
stolen trailer was on defendant's property); People v. Sellars, 93 Ill. App. 3d 744, 745, 417 N.E.2d
877, 879 (1981) (informants approached police officer and told him that the defendant was in posses-
sion of stolen goods from a recent burglary). In Sanders, however, the crime was already under
investigation and the authorities told the informant about the evidence they sought. Sanders, 327
N.C. at 328, 395 S.E.2d at 418. Nonetheless, in some respects the facts of these cases suggested even
higher governmental involvement than in Sanders. See id. (citing Miller, 688 F.2d at 655 (FBI
agents invited informant to visit the suspect's premises with them); Sellars, 93 Ill. App. 3d at 747,
417 N.E.2d at 880 (officers suggested informants get invited inside and report what they observed,
but informants broke into suspect's house and stole the evidence)).
27. Sanders, 327 N.C. at 333, 395 S.E.2d at 422. In three of the five cases cited, the police
actually had participated in the search. Id. (citing Corngold v. United States, 367 F.2d 1, 2 (9th Cir.
1966) (customs agents informed airline employee that they suspected package contained contraband,
asked him if he wanted to open the package, observed him open it, and then assisted in removing the
contents); United States v. Robinson, 504 F. Supp. 425, 428 (N.D. Ga. 1980) (while questioning
suspect with airline employee present, DEA agent failed to secure suspect's consent to search suit-
case; airline employee opened the suitcase when DEA agent placed keys in front of him on table);
People v. Barber, 94 Ill. App. 3d 813, 814, 419 N.E.2d 71, 72 (1981) (police officers approached
landlord and, after landlord unlocked the suspect's apartment, entered and searched with landlord)).
Thus, the extent of government involvement was very high.
In the other two cases the citizen was a regular informant for the authorities. The courts in
those two cases had found this fact dispositive on the issue of the citizen's motive. Sanders, 327 N.C.
at 333, 395 S.E.2d at 422 (citing United States v. Walther, 652 F.2d 788, 790 (1981) (regular inform-
ant for the DEA had as sole motivation for the search the expectation of reward money); State v.
Boynton, 58 Haw. 530, 539, 574 P.2d 1330, 1335 (1978) (the regular informant did not "seem to
have had a reason for being at the [suspect's] residence or for searching the area... which [was] not
inexorably linked to police concerns")).
28. Sanders, 327 N.C. at 334, 395 S.E.2d at 422 (emphasis added). The same language has been
used by a number of other courts. See, eg., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 487 (1971)
("whether... in light of all the circumstances of the case [the citizen] must be regarded as having
acted as an 'instrument' or agent of the state").
29. Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 487; see supra note 22 and accompanying text.
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tions:30 "Factors to be given special consideration include the citizen's motiva-
tion for the search or seizure, the degree of governmental involvement, such as
advice, encouragement, [or] knowledge about the nature of the citizen's activi-
ties, and the legality of the conduct encouraged by the police."31 Though the
facts in Sanders suggested a high degree of police encouragement, the scope of
the search Deputy Brown authorized, as well as its legality, were of critical
importance.32
The court concluded that Gardin's primary motive for the search was to
console the grieving family.33 It reasoned that even though he based his actions
on information provided by the authorities, the fact that he repeatedly asked
others whether he should help the family indicated that his motives were in-
dependent from the interests of the state.3 4 The court dealt summarily with
Brown's encouragement of Gardin.
The extent of Brown's recruitment of Gardin was to advise him
that defendant was under suspicion, describe certain evidence that
might link defendant to the crime, and to ask Gardin if he could gain
entry into defendant's house or locate defendant and talk with him.
Brown mentioned a reward fund .... The meeting ended up with
Brown... giving Gardin a code name.35
While acknowledging that these facts might give rise to an agency relation-
ship, the court derailed the fourth amendment challenge to the seizure of the
victim's watch and ring. The court stated that because Gardin exceeded the
putative authority given by Brown and searched the bedroom by misrepresent-
ing Sanders' criminal liability to his sister, that action was not subject to consti-
tutional scrutiny. 36 Having discussed one plan to enter the defendant's home,
the court held, Gardin's deviation from that plan severed any connection be-
tween official conduct and the search.
The doctrine of agency search as it has developed since 1920 leaves ample
room for the Sanders court's conclusion that the search was private. The United
States Supreme Court first distinguished searches and seizures by private citizens
30. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
31. Sanders, 327 N.C. at 334, 395 S.E.2d at 422 (emphasis added). The inclusion of this "legal-
ity" factor as an express part of the test is without precedent. When police have encouraged the
citizen's search, other courts have noted legality as merely one consideration among many. See
United States v. Miller, 688 F.2d 652, 657 (1982); People v. Sellars, 93 Ill. App. 3d 744, 748, 417
N.E.2d 877, 881 (1981). See generally W. LAFAVE, supra note 6, § 1.8(b), at 190-91 (police have no
duty to prevent a private citizen from making a legal search that they could not conduct themselves).
In identifying "legality" as a distinct factor in a tripartite test, the North Carolina Supreme Court
implied that it should be given greater weight than other factors reflecting the nature of police in-
volvement. It is unclear whether the court intended this emphasis. See infra note 57.
32. Sanders, 327 N.C. at 335, 395 S.E.2d at 423. The court held that even if Gardin's visit to
defendant's home after his conversation with Brown was an agency search, when he exceeded the
scope of the plan he discussed with Brown and proceeded with what was arguably an illegal search,
there was no longer official knowledge or acquiescence. Id.
33. Id. at 334, 395 S.E.2d at 422.
34. Indeed, Gardin's own testimony suggested prompting from a higher authority than the
police: "Jesus placed this task in front of me." Id.
35. Id. at 335, 395 S.E.2d at 422-23.
36. Id. at 335, 395 S.E.2d at 423.
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from those by the government in the landmark case of Burdeau v. McDowell.37
McDowell, a utility company executive, was discharged for" fraudulent conduct
in the course of business. After his departure, agents of his former employer
forced open two safes and his desk and removed papers belonging to him. The
company later made those papers available to the government and they were
introduced against him in a prosecution for fraudulent use of the mails. Mc-
Dowell moved to have the evidence returned to him. Though he made no alle-
gation that officers of the United States had committed an unlawful act,
McDowell alleged that the fourth amendment precluded them from using the
fruits of an illegal search. The Court held that the fourth amendment did not
apply to these facts because the provision was "intended as a restraint upon the
activities of sovereign authority, and was not intended to be a limitation upon
other than governmental agencies."' 38
The Burdeau dissent, while acknowledging the absence of any constitu-
tional prohibition, asserted that the state's use of such stolen property was un-
conscionable. In a brief opinion Justice Brandeis noted the basic judicial
aversion to allowing the government to use such evidence by exempting private
searches from the fourth amendment. "Respect for the law will not be advanced
by resort... to means which shock the common man's sense of decency and fair
play."'39
For many years the courts applied the Burdeau rule without specifically
identifying the considerations to be taken into account in applying the private
search exemption. The only modem Supreme Court decision to address the is-
sue was Coolidge v. New Hampshire.40 While authorities were interrogating the
defendant murder suspect at the police station, two officers visited Mrs. Coo-
lidge at the Coolidges' home. When they asked whether Mr. Coolidge owned
any guns, Mrs. Coolidge produced the weapons and asked if the officers wanted
to take them. They did. The defendant argued that when his wife brought out
the guns, she was acting as an agent of the government, "complying with a 'de-
mand.' "41 Although the majority reiterated that the question should be ex-
amined in light of all the circumstances, their analysis focused on two factors.
On the one hand, the Court found that Mrs. Coolidge's natural desire to vindi-
cate her husband had motivated her to assist the police in their investigation. 42
The Court grappled with the question of whether her choice to act as she did
was real:
[T]here no doubt always exist forces pushing the spouse to coop-
37. 256 U.S. 465 (1920).
38. Id. at 475.
39. Id. at 477 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). One commentator called the approach taken from this
quandary "ratified intent"; that is, "where the evidence is taken to aid the Government, and when
the Government uses the evidence, the taint of that illegal action is transferred to the Government so
as to make the use unlawful." Comment, 44 N.Y.U. L. Rlv. 206, 209 (1969). See generally W.
LAFAvE, supra note 6, § 1.8(e), at 208-11 (discussing jurisprudential treatment of the use of illegally
obtained evidence).
40. 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
41. Id. at 487.
42. Id. at 487-89.
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erate with the police. Among these are the simple but often powerful
convention of openness and honesty, the fear that secretive behavior
will intensify suspicion, and uncertainty as to what course is most
likely to be helpful to the absent spouse.... But there is nothing
constitutionally suspect in the existence, without more, of these incen-
tives to full disclosure or active cooperation with police.43
The Supreme Court held that such a private motive to conduct a search militates
against invoking the fourth amendment under the agency doctrine.44 The sec-
ond factor the Coolidge Court addressed was the extent of government involve-
ment in initiating the citizen's actions. The majority noted that "[t]here is not
the slightest implication of an attempt on [the officers'] part to coerce or domi-
nate her, or, for that matter, to direct her actions by the more subtle techniques
of suggestion that are available to officials in circumstances like these."'45
Coolidge is susceptible of a narrow interpretation: when the citizen's mo-
tive exists independently from the goals of the police, a court should find a pri-
vate search.46 In otherwords, when the police do nothing to influence the
citizen, despite using "more subtle techniques of suggestion," there is no fourth
amendment protection. But this interpretation has not carried the day.47 Cases
following Coolidge have defined "private search" more broadly, suggesting that
a citizen may act with substantial motivation to further law enforcement ends
and, without warrant, probable cause, or exigent circumstances, law enforce-
ment authorities may substantially encourage the citizen to conduct a search.48
Contemporary cases applying this broad construction often cite the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit's opinion in United States v.
Walther.49 In Walther, the Ninth Circuit described a two-part test: "two of the
critical factors in the 'instrument or agent' analysis are: (1) the government's
knowledge and acquiescence, and (2) the intent of the party performing the
search."'50 Even before Walther, these two factors had dominated most judicial
discussion of the private search.5 1 Under this test, what actions by the authori-
ties rise to the level of a police-instigated search, and what motives of the citizen
constitute a desire to assist law enforcement? These threshold questions cause
tremendous confusion.
Cases addressing the first issue, the level of governmental involvement nec-
43. Id. at 487-88.
44. Id. at 488.
45. Id. at 489.
46. In the closing sentence of the majority opinion, Justice Stewart characterized Mrs. Coo-
lidge's actions as a "spontaneous, good-faith effort by his wife to clear him of suspicion." Id. at 490.
47. The Supreme Court has not reviewed a "private search" case in the twenty years since
Coolidge.
48. See infra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
49. 652 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1981).
50. Id. at 792. The Walther court did not assert that these were the exclusive factors to be
considered. It held only that those were "the factors which [had] generated most of the contro-
versy" on that particular appeal. Id. Nonetheless, several courts have cited Walther and treated
these factors as exclusive criteria. See, eg., United States v. Bazan, 807 F.2d 1200, 1202-03 (5th Cir.
1986); United States v. Snowadzki, 723 F.2d 1427, 1429 (9th Cir. 1984).
51. See, eg., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 487-89 (1971).
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essary to transform a search by a private citizen into a governmental search by
proxy, vary widely. At one extreme are fact patterns in which there is no con-
tact between the citizen and any governmental officer until after the citizen has
completed the private search. No court can subject such a search to the fourth
amendment under Burdeau. For example, in United States v. Sherwin,52 a
trucking terminal manager came upon an open carton addressed to the "Talk of
the Town Adult Book Store" in Las Vegas. On examining the contents, the
manager discovered obscene material and reported it to the FBI. The Ninth
Circuit rejected the defendant's challenge to the seizure. The court acknowl-
edged that the Coolidge language, which requires a court to look at the issue in
light of all the circumstances, "frequently require[s] a careful factual analysis,"'5 3
but the court asserted that no such care was needed in Sherwin: "[T]here is little
difficulty in holding the fourth amendment inapplicable to the instant case be-
cause prior or contemporaneous governmental involvement in the search was
totally absent."54
Sherwin suggests that the minimum level of governmental involvement is
some degree of prior knowledge of and acquiescence in the citizen's actions. 55
Judge (now Justice) Kennedy noted that at the other end of the spectrum are
those cases in which the "governmental involvement in a search is so pervasive
that.., the fourth amendment is applicable to such a 'joint venture' because of
the intrusive actions of the officials themselves." 5 6 In the middle lie the cases in
which the government officials undertake no part in the searches, but in which
their prior involvement serves as a catalyst.
The lowest threshold would seem to be official involvement comporting
with the minimum standard implied by the language to "know" and "acqui-
esce." Thus, if by any means law enforcement authorities come to know of a
private citizen's intent to conduct a search of another citizen's property and
make no effort to prevent it, these facts would establish bare knowledge and
acquiescence. It seems clear, however, that simple knowledge or acquiescence is
insufficient for fourth amendment protection to attach. 57
52. 539 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1976).
53. Id. at 6.
54. Id.; see also United States v. Goldstein, 532 F.2d 1305, 1311 (9th Cir. 1976) (fourth amend-
ment restricts government action, rather than the actions of private individuals); United States v.
Clegg, 509 F.2d 605, 609 (5th Cir. 1975) (same); United States v. Harless, 464 F.2d 953, 956-57 (9th
Cir. 1972) (same).
55. Sherwin, 539 F.2d at 6; see also United States v. Miller, 688 F.2d 652, 656-57 (9th Cir.
1982) (citing Walther test and analyzing knowledge and acquiescence factors).
56. Sherwin, 539 F.2d at 6 n.5.
57. See, eg., Gundlach v. Janing, 401 F. Supp. 1089, 1093 (D. Neb. 1975) (mere knowledge on
the part of police that a citizen will conduct a search, and an absence of any deterrent action by
police, is not sufficient to establish agency), aff'd per curtam, 536 F.2d 754 (8th Cir. 1976). This is
true at least when the search is not illegal (Le., not burglary or larceny). Miller, 688 F.2d at 657.
But see Gundlach, 401 F. Supp. at 1093 (in the context of fourth amendment agency analysis, the
illegality of a search does not place a greater burden on police to prevent the citizen from conducting
it).
Even if a search were illegal, it is unclear what difference this would make regarding the protec-
tions of the fourth amendment. If the government instigated the search, then the constitutional
protections attach whether or not the search would amount to illegal conduct on the part of a private
individual. It is another matter to consider whether, in standing by and allowing one citizen to
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At least one court has expressed the two-part test in different terms, remov-
ing the ambiguity of the phrase "knowledge or acquiescence." In United States
v. Lambert,5 8 the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit asserted
that "the police must have instigated, encouraged, or participated in the
search."5 9 The positive actions these terms represent suggest that a court, to
find agency, should require an affirmative role on the part of the authorities.
The private citizen in Lambert was the defendant's housekeeper. She contacted
the FBI when she became suspicious that there was drug activity in the house.
In holding that there was no agency, the court noted that far from taking any
active part in removing the evidence from the house, the officers specifically had
told her not to do so.60
The general rule is that "other pre-search contacts between a government
official and private citizen, whether or not apparently intended by the former to
prompt the latter to render some type of assistance, are not deemed sufficient to
make a search by a private citizen other than a 'private' search." 6 1 This general
rule does not reveal, however, how far the police may go in instigating a search
before the exclusionary rule attaches. Professor LaFave suggested that a police-
man may not ask a citizen to conduct a particular search.62 Thus, when the
police instigated a search by asking a landlord to enter his tenant's room, the
Illinois Court of Appeals held the search to be governmental.6 3 Although it was
important that the police later entered the room, the court held that the private
citizen's earlier entrance "[did] not negate the conclusion that he was acting as
their agent. ' ' 64
Even when officers do not request a specific search, some courts have held
that pervasive prior contact between an officer and the citizen, as between a
detective and his "snitch," brings any search by that citizen to the level of an
agency search.6 5 More often than not, however, a court will hold prior contact
between an officer and a citizen insufficient to render later searches subject to
constitutional protection. In one case, a former law enforcement officer noticed
suspicious activity on his neighbor's land and informed the Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA). 66 At their second meeting, the DEA told him to report
if he saw trucks entering the ranch and then to "get out of there." 67 When the
informant trespassed to secure further information, the court found the DEA's
instructions and the nature of their involvement with the citizen "far too vague
commit a crime against another, the police expose themselves to some civil liability for failure to
perform their executory duty of preventing a crime.
58. 771 F.2d 83 (6th Cir. 1985).
59. Id. at 89.
60. Id.
61. W. LAFAVE, supra note 6, § 1.8(b), at 192.
62. Id.
63. People v. Barber, 94 Ill. App. 3d 813, 814, 419 N.E.2d 71, 72 (1981).
64. Id. at 815, 419 N.E.2d at 73.
65. See State v. Boynton, 58 Haw. 530, 539, 574 P.2d 1330, 1335 (1978).
66. United States v. Bazan, 807 F.2d 1200, 1202 (5th Cir. 1986).
67. Id. at 1203.
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and general to constitute" sufficient governmental involvement. 68 In a more
dramatic example of how much government involvement courts will tolerate, an
individual contacted the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and stated that a co-
worker was defrauding the government of taxes on his sale of used aircraft en-
gine cores.6 9 The informant asked if records of the sales would be helpful and
inquired about a reward. The Ninth Circuit held that, because the IRS had not
prompted or encouraged the citizen to seize the evidence, the act was a private
search.70
The cases invite courts to overstep the fourth amendment7 1 by providing no
objective criteria for agency.72 In United States v. Coleman,73 although the po-
lice were present when the citizen, who had previously notified them of his in-
tent to repossess it, searched the defendant's car, the court held that their
presence was nothing more than "benign attendance." 74 That court expressed
the standard as requiring that the police "actually compel[]" the intrusion.7" In
this pronouncement, the Coleman court overstated the requisite level of govern-
mental involvement. 76
The other oft-cited consideration in the two-part analysis for determining
68. Id. In Bazan, it may also have been important that in trespassing, the informant exceeded
the scope of the official request. The Bazan court did not focus on the illegality of the informant's
entry onto the defendant's land. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found that the DEA's
total lack of knowledge that the informant intended a search at all was important. Id. at 1204. In
Sanders, the Supreme Court of North Carolina found such overstepping important in holding that
Gardin was not acting as an agent of the law enforcement authorities. Sanders, 327 N.C. at 335, 395
S.E.2d at 423. The court went so far as to characterize Gardin's search of the defendant's bedroom
as a "private, unsolicited, unsupervised act." Id.; see supra note 32 and accompanying text.
69. United States v. Snowadzki, 723 F.2d 1427, 1428 (9th Cir. 1984).
70. Id.
71. See infra text following note 125.
72. See, eg., United States v. Walther, 652 F.2d 788, 791 (9th Cir. 1981) ("[We] decline to
announce a definite standard for findings that a private citizen has acted as an 'agent' of the govern-
ment."). The Walther court stated that "[w]hile a certain degree of governmental participation is
necessary before a private citizen is transformed into an agent of the state, de minimis or incidental
contacts between the citizen and law enforcement agents ... will not subject the search to fourth
amendment scrutiny." Id. Though there are no objective criteria for the requisite level of govern-
mental involvement, many of the courts that find agency also find, significant private motivation for
the search. See, eg., Bazan, 807 F.2d at 1204 (informant was quite concerned about illegal activity
on his neighbor's land); Snowadzki, 723 F.2d at 1430 (informant was interested in reward, but IRS
had not encouraged him to act to secure it).
73. 628 F.2d 961 (6th Cir. 1980).
74. Id. at 964.
75. Id. (citing Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978)). Coleman is a good example of how
the lack of a more objective test for agency can lead courts to confuse the standard. Flagg Bros. was
an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against a landlord who sold a delinquent tenant's personal prop-
erty pursuant to New York law. The plaintiff alleged that this was a fourteenth amendment due
process violation carried out "under color of state law." Flagg Bros., 436 U.S. at 156. The Court
held that the landlord's action would not be attributed to the state since the state law did not compel
the sale. Id. at 165. Thus the Flagg Bros. Court required actual compulsion in order to hold that a
private citizen's action was under color of state law for stating a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, not
to find that a private citizen's search was attributable to the state for fourth amendment purposes.
Compare Coleman, 628 F.2d at 965 (government must compel intrusion) with United States v.
Robinson, 504 F. Supp. 425, 431 (N.D. Ga. 1980) (Although DEA agent never ordered airline
employee to open defendant's suitcase and never suggested he do so, airline employee was acting at
the unspoken encouragement of DEA; but for the DEA's ancillary acts and statements, the search
would not have taken place and thus was attributable to the government.).
76. See supra text accompanying notes 56 and 65.
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whether a court should attribute a search to the government is the private citi-
zen's motivation for conducting it. In Walther, an airline employee who had
served as a confidential informant in the past and had been paid for information
on many occasions searched a parcel shipped by his employer airline.77 The
court held that the employee acted as a government agent.7 8 The facts were
sufficient to support the trial court's finding that the employee had opened the
package with the expectation of a probable reward from the DEA, 79 and that
this was the requisite state of mind of a governmental agent.80 Thus one circum-
stance that consistently points toward agency is money paid in return for infor-
mation, particularly when there is a long-standing relationship involving
payments for information.8' But payment is not dispositive.82
A private motive generally is indicated when the victim of the crime con-
ducts the search.8 3 Thus, a victim's search conducted in an attempt to recover
the stolen property has been held to be a private search.84 Likewise, when an
airline searches luggage or parcels on board its planes, the airline usually has a
private purpose.8 5 Courts often hold that these common carrier cases stand on
different ground than ordinary private search cases. The right of the airline to
guard against shipping contraband or dangerous freight, for example, often is
established by tariff law.86
If the foregoing considerations are not significant, the inquiry into the citi-
zen's motive becomes more subjective. As with governmental involvement,
some nominal prior contact probably is necessary.87 It is simplistic to say that
the citizen must be moved to conduct the search by a desire to assist law en-
forcement authorities for a court to conclude that the citizen is a government
agent. The object of the official investigation is to curtail the illegal activity.
77. United States v. Walther, 652 F.2d 788, 790 (9th Cir. 1981).
78. Id. at 793.
79. Id. at 791.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 793; see also State v. Boynton, 58 Haw. 530, 537, 574 P.2d 1330, 1333 (1978) (Pay-
ment made by government is to be considered along with other facts as indicative of a governmental
search.).
82. See, e.g., United States v. Valen, 479 F.2d 467, 469 (3d Cir. 1973) (prior contacts between
customs agents and informant, including reward payments, did not establish prima facie case of
agency).
83. Sanders, 327 N.C. at 332-33, 395 S.E.2d at 421; see also United States v. Miller, 688 F.2d
652, 657 (1982) (holding that the citizen was motivated by a desire to recover his stolen property).
84. Gundlach v. Janing, 401 F. Supp. 1089, 1093 (D. Neb. 1975), aff'dper curiam, 536 F.2d
754 (8th Cir. 1976). As is true of most cases decided under the two-part analysis, motive was not the
dispositive factor in Gundlach. The motive of the employer to recover property stolen by the em-
ployee was private, but the court also analyzed the extent of the governmental involvement. In
Gundlach there was no official influence or encouragement to conduct the search; these two consid-
erations led the court to conclude that no fourth amendment intrusion had occurred. Id. at 1094.
85. Eg., United States v. Jennings, 653 F.2d 107, 110 (4th Cir. 1981); Gold v. United States,
378 F.2d 588, 591 (9th Cir. 1967).
86. Jennings, 653 F.2d at 110. In addition to the existence of statutory authority to conduct the
search, the Jennings court noted that "the purposes of the airline are served by free communication
of information between law enforcement agents and the agents of an airline whose duties involve the
detection of dangerous or illegal cargo." Id.
87. See Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1920); United States v. Sherwin, 539 F.2d 1,
6 (9th Cir. 1976); State v. Kornegay, 313 N.C. 1, 10, 326 S.E.2d 881, 890 (1985).
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Thus, if a citizen wishes to rid himself or society of the wrongdoer, he can serve
that personal goal only by helping the police "get their man." This circular
relationship contributes to the disparity of judicial results.
The problem is that these are "mixed motive" cases. In United States v.
Bazan,88 for example, the defendant's neighbor searched the adjoining property
when the neighbor suspected illegal drug activity. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the neighbor lacked the intent necessary
to establish agency, finding that his motivation was a "concern[] about the ille-
gal activity nearby."8 9 United States v. Lambert9° yielded a contrary result.
The defendant's housekeeper became suspicious about her employer's activities.
She went to the FBI with information about his activities and later searched and
seized many items over a period of weeks.9 1 Even though her motive was her
concern about the effect of drugs on children, the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Sixth Circuit found "it was clear that [the housekeeper] acted with
the requisite intent" of an agent.92
A court faced with the issue of a citizen's search must weigh a broad array
of subjective factors. When a police officer explicitly directs an individual to
conduct a search, and the individual does so solely to reap a reward, courts have
little trouble in attributing that action to the government and applying the
fourth amendment. In reality the facts are rarely so straightforward. Though
payment may be involved, the citizen may have other motives, such as a desire
to rid her neighborhood of crime. Though the officer may have discussed the
search with a citizen, the idea to conduct a specific search may have originated
with the individual. It is not surprising that the results of such balancing are
difficult to predict.
Given this state of private search jurisprudence, the North Carolina
Supreme Court's reasoning in Sanders is understandable. The court upheld the
trial court's finding that Gardin's primary motive was to aid the grieving fam-
ily.93 Though the court found that Gardin received more than seven thousand
dollars for his assistance, this fact was insufficient to establish a dispositive mo-
tive to assist the criminal investigation. 94
88. 807 F.2d 1200 (5th Cir. 1986).
89. Id. at 1204.
90. 771 F.2d 83 (6th Cir. 1985).
91. Id. at 86.
92. Id. at 89. The court went on to hold that though the informant satisfied the motive test of
agency, the FBI's involvement was insufficient to make the search governmental for purposes of the
fourth amendment. Id.; see supra text accompanying notes 58-60. In another case, the court dis-
missed the government's "private motive" argument when in opening a passenger's bag, an airline
employee was trying merely to discover the owner. United States v. Robinson, 504 F. Supp. 425, 431
(N.D. Ga. 1980). The passenger was with the airline representative when he unlocked the bag. The
court found that the airline employee was motivated by the presence of a DEA agent and his re-
peated requests of the passenger for consent to search. Id.
93. Sanders, 327 N.C. at 334, 395 S.E.2d at 418. The determination of citizen's motive is an
issue of fact to be determined by the trial court and is not subject to close review on appeal.
94. Brown testified at trial that he never paid Gardin anything. Id. at 336, 395 S.E.2d at 423.
The supreme court noted that "[bloth Brown's and Gardin's versions of this incident were before the
jury." Id. Though the conclusion that this contradictory testimony did not prejudice the defendant
is justifiable, it arguably suggests that Brown himself subjectively believed there was some reason to
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The Sanders court analyzed the extent of governmental involvement under
the terms "advice, encouragement, [or] knowledge."95 This suggests that the
court weighed the facts based on both a benign, passive "knowledge" stan-
dard,96 and a more active "encouragement" standard. 97 Sanders borrows
eich6s from the full panoply of precedent and arrives at a result that gives little
weight to those considerations. Regarding Gardin's search of the defendant's
house in general, Brown advised him of the identity of the suspect, his theory of
how the crime was committed, and exactly what evidence the authorities sought.
Brown encouraged Gardin to conduct a search for that evidence when he asked
him if he could "gain entry into defendant's house" and look for it.98 Brown
had knowledge of Gardin's general intent to conduct a search when the inform-
ant called him and told him of his plan to use a ruse to get in.
By focusing on the specific search that yielded the evidence (the second
attempt, which Gardin did not discuss with Brown) the court found that any
agency that might have been established by the foregoing facts did not exist
when the evidence was recovered.99 While acknowledging that Gardin's actions
until the time he deviated from the plan discussed with Brown might have been
an "agency search," 1°° the court concluded that once he did something not ex-
pressly discussed with the officer, Gardin extinguished the putative agency.101
The court also gratuitously noted that "[a]t no time did any law enforcement
officer tell Gardin to do anything illegal."' 102
Although the result in Sanders is justifiable from a reading of the cases, it is
counterintuitive to those not familiar with the development of fourth amend-
ment agency jurisprudence. The police did not have probable cause to search or
arrest, but there was specific evidence for which, were it not for the strictures of
the fourth amendment, they would search. By a fortuity, a private citizen who
happened to know both the victim's and the suspect's families came forward and
inquired how he might help. The officer then provided him with all the informa-
tion that left the police short of probable cause, expressly asked him to do what
the police could not do themselves, and offered to reward him for it. When the
citizen followed through on a plan discussed with the authorities, and was un-
successful, he tried a second time. Still attempting to accomplish the task the
police had given him, and possibly under the impression that the authorities had
sanctioned his actions, he found and seized the evidence. With this evidence and
misrepresent this fact. One explanation is that payment would be evidence tending to show that
Gardin was acting as his agent and it was not in Brown's interest that the court find agency. See
supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
95. Sanders, 327 N.C. at 334, 395 S.E.2d at 422.
96. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
97. See supra text accompanying notes 58-60.
98. Sanders, 327 N.C. at 335, 395 S.E.2d at 423.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. The Court characterized the second search as "Gardin's private, unsolicited, un-
supervised act of seizing evidence." Id. Describing the search as unsolicited and unsupervised im-
plies total ignorance of those actions. Brown had asked his informant to conduct a search and
Gardin had consulted with Brown in planning it.
102. Id.; see supra note 57.
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the attendant search warrant, the police concluded in a single day an investiga-
tion that had languished for weeks. 103 Sanders suggests that the competing in-
terests of effective law enforcement and fourth amendment restrictions on
gathering evidence are in marked conflict under the agency-search jurisprudence
developed since Burdeau and Coolidge.
In analyzing why courts look to the private individual's motive to conduct a
search, it is useful to consider the purposes of the fourth amendment and the
exclusionary rule. By excluding evidence obtained through unreasonable
searches, the courts act to deter such intrusions. 1 4 The exclusionary rule is
based primarily on the "necessity for an effective deterrent to illegal police ac-
tion."'10 5 In the context of private searches, application of the exclusionary rule
should focus on deterring police action that leads to the private search. In de-
ciding whether there has been a government search by proxy, there should be
definite behavior on the part of the authorities that gives rise to the search. It is
this definable behavior that the exclusionary rule may then act to discourage. 106
If a court's determination of whether a search by a citizen was private or
governmental does not focus on the objective nature of the police interaction
with the citizen, police may be responsible for instigating searches that they
could not conduct themselves. Judicial decisions that allow police broad scope
in what they can say and do to assist a private citizen in searching for evidence
indirectly undermines the probable cause and warrant requirements that are
normally a component of such searches. Clearly, the law cannot tolerate an
unspoken understanding that law enforcement officers intentionally may insti-
gate a search by a private party in order to sidestep the fourth amendment.' 0 7
Yet such sidestepping, in a subtle form, is what took place in Sanders. In-
vestigator Brown requested a search and provided detailed information regard-
ing the object of that search. In connection with the same investigation and
evidence, Brown lied on the sworn affidavit with which he secured a warrant for
the follow-up search. 0 8 Brown also gave the same false testimony at both tri-
103. Sanders, 327 N.C. at 330, 395 S.E.2d at 420.
104. W. LAFAVE, supra note 6, § 1.1(e), at 16.
105. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 636-37 (1965) (emphasis added); see also Burdeau v.
McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1920) (The fourth amendment "was intended as a restraint upon the
activities of sovereign authority.").
106. Objectively definable behavior is a prerequisite because the exclusionary rule is not provided
as an after-the-fact remedy for the citizen who is subjected to the search sub judice "[T]he rule's
primary purpose is to deter future unlawful police conduct and thereby effectuate the guarantee of
the Fourth Amendment." United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974); see also United
States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 918 (1984) (if exclusion is to deter, it must alter police behavior).
107. United States v. Jennings, 653 F.2d 107, 110 (1981) ("A governmental agent may not avoid
constitutional restraints upon his conduct by procuring a private individual to perform a forbidden
act for him."); see also Burkoff, Not So Private Searches and the Constitution, 66 CORNELL L. REV.
627, 640 (1981) ("The most significant deterrent effect of applying an exclusionary rule in this setting
may well be to discourage law enforcement agents from encouraging or entering into unlawful, sub
rosa, compacts with private actors."); Note, Evidence Illegally Obtained by Private Persons Held
Inadmissible in State CivilAction, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 168, 174 (1963) ("[A] grave danger exists that
the general admissibility of such evidence may create an atmosphere encouraging government offi-
cials to act in clandestine concert with private persons, while concerted activity would undoubtedly
taint such evidence and require its exclusion.").
108. Sanders, 327 N.C. at 330, 395 S.E.2d at 420; see supra note 19. After Gardin had given the
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als.1 9 Neither the trial court nor the supreme court considered whether Brown
might have believed that there was a problem with Gardin's search. 1 0 If the
investigating officer finds it necessary to misrepresent the facts surrounding his
involvement and encouragement of a search conducted by a private citizen, the
police subjectively may believe that they were responsible for the search. In
addition, the likely result of a finding that the fruits of Gardin's search were
subject to the exclusionary rule may have moved the supreme court to uphold
the trial court in Sanders. Had the court found that Gardin was an agent, it
probably would have suppressed the confession.1 11 If the state had been forced
to try Sanders without the best physical evidence linking him with the crime and
without his confession, the jury undoubtedly would have returned an acquittal.
This result would have been tantamount to "letting him off on a
technicality."1 12
Nonetheless, the concern of courts and commentators that the jurispru-
dence of private searches leaves too much latitude may have come home in
Sanders. Two aspects of the case deserve scrutiny. First, in light of the primary
goal of the exclusionary rule-to deter some modes of police practice-judicial
analysis of the citizen's motive for conducting a search is misplaced. The citi-
zen's motive for becoming involved in a particular case can have no effect on
watch and ring he had seized during his search to Deputy Brown, the officer swore that "a reliable
informant who has proven reliable in the past and given me information which resulted in the arrest
and convictions of [other felons]... observed jewelry with the same description and type known to
have been stolen from the [victim]" at the defendant's residence. Sanders, 327 N.C. at 330, 395
S.E.2d at 420. The informant, Gardin, had never before provided Brown with information. At the
time Brown swore out the affidavit, he himself was in possession of the evidence. It was no longer at
the defendant's residence because Gardin had taken it.
109. See supra note 11 (noting flagrancy of the official misconduct as a consideration in deciding
whether to suppress fruits of an illegal search).
110. The issue of suppressing the evidence aside, the supreme court acknowledged in its opinion
that a law enforcement officer had given false testimony in a capital murder trial. Sanders, 327 N.C.
at 337, 395 S.E.2d at 424. The absence of any reproach for these acts is conspicuous. The supreme
court's benign acceptance of the facts of this case is the very signal that will make such behavior
more likely in the future.
11I. See supra note 11.
112. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. The state pointed out this problem to the court in
its final brief.
The ultimate resolution of this specific issue is of paramount importance.... A deter-
mination that the watch and ring were seized by a governmental . . . search will have
profound and far reaching implications for both the state and the defendant ...
[R]esolution of this search question is of great importance to the continued vitality of the
confession. If both the watch and ring and the confession are suppressed, it is unlikely that
there would remain sufficient evidence to support any prosecution.
Supplemental Brief for the State at 7, Sanders (No. 88A85). Indeed, the United States Supreme
Court has endorsed the concept that courts should weigh such concerns in applying the exclusionary
rule. "[W]hen law enforcement officers have acted in objective good faith or their transgressions
have been minor, the magnitude of the benefit conferred on such guilty defendants offends basic
concepts of the criminal justice system." United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 908 (1983). Commen-
tators and courts also have noted that a secondary purpose of the fourth amendment is to protect the
integrity of the judiciary by insulating it from the taint of illegally gotten evidence. W. LAFAVE,
supra note 6, § 1.1(e), at 16-17; see also Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 223 (1960) ("[Tlhe
federal courts should not be accomplices in the willful disobedience of a Constitution they are sworn
to uphold."). This goal of maintaining judicial integrity arguably is harmed if the public perceives




what the police do. The Supreme Court's 1971 opinion in Coolidge 113 speaks
directly to this point:
[Tihere is nothing constitutionally suspect in the existence, with-
out more, of these incentives to full disclosure of active cooperation
with the police. The exclusionary rules were fashioned "to prevent,
not to repair," and their target is official misconduct.... [I]t is no part
of the policy underlying the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to
discourage citizens from aiding to the utmost of their ability in the
apprehension of criminals.1 14
To the extent that a court can determine the subjective motives of a private
searcher, those motives may be circumstantial evidence of what the law enforce-
ment officers did in regard to procuring the search. Thus a citizen's motive to
secure a reward is probative of the manner in which the police acted to get the
citizen's cooperation.' 15 The emphasis on motive in the popular two-part test,
however, is misplaced.1 16 The deterrent purposes of the exclusionary rule would
be better served by subsuming consideration' of the citizen's motive under the
essential question of what the government has done that may have led to a
search.
The basic question should be: "What did the law enforcement officer do to
instigate the search?" The cases make it clear that if the police do not execute
the search and the search would likely have occurred without their instigation,
there is essentially no police behavior to deter. In the context of explicit police
requests, one commentator has suggested that the individual's action should be
attributed to the police "whenever the acts ... would not have occurred but for
the police request." 117 The courts should apply the same test for any action-
advice, encouragement, or instigation-that may have induced a citizen to con-
duct a search.
The court in United States v. Robinsonl"" used a but-for analysis. The
DEA suspected an airline passenger of carrying drugs. A DEA agent ques-
tioned the passenger in a private room with an employee of the airline present.
The agent repeatedly asked the suspect for his consent to open his suitcase. The
defendant refused to give his consent. The DEA agent took the suitcase keys,
which he had gotten from the suspect, and placed them on the table near the
suitcase and in front of the airline employee. The airline employee then un-
locked and opened the suitcase and found that it contained marijuana. 119 The
court sought to determine the DEA agent's involvement in the "total
enterprise." 120
113. 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
114. Id. at 488 (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960)) (citation omitted).
115. Cf. Comment, Police Bulletins and Private Searches, 119 U. PA. L. REv. 162, 168 (1970) (In
finding that the employer of the individual who conducted the search had no private motive, "it may
be presumed that the actions were induced by the police request.") (emphasis added).
116. See supra notes 77-92 and accompanying text.
117. Comment, supra note 115, at 167 (emphasis added).
118. 504 F. Supp. 425 (N.D. Ga. 1980).
119. Id. at 427-28.
120. Id. at 431.
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Had he not requested Delta employees to locate defendant's two
checked suitcases, they would have been transferred... ; had he not
placed the keys to the blue suitcase on a desk in front of the Delta
agent and told the defendant in the Delta agent's presence that the
keys appeared to fit the lock on the suitcase, the Delta agent would not
have had access... ; and had he not continued to request defendant to
consent to a search of the suitcase in the Delta agent's presence the
Delta agent may never have learned that a law enforcement officer
wished to have the suitcase opened.... [Tihe Delta agent opened the
bag at the unspoken, but real, encouragement of [the DEA]. 121
Robinson's but-for analysis flowed directly from the Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peal's recognition that by simply categorizing the acts of a law enforcement of-
ficer as minimal forms of encouragement, the fourth amendment's safeguards
inadvertently could be undercut. 122
The but-for inquiry should still embody a search for those elements of offi-
cial involvement on which the cases currently focus. Governmental encourage-
ment, instigation, and participation comprise definable acts that courts should
scrutinize to determine if the police were responsible for the search. The result
of a subjective analysis of these acts, however, may fall short of achieving the
goal of deterrence. The standard should be more objective: whether the search
would not have taken place but for the police involvement, and whether the
authorities reasonably could have foreseen that their actions would cause the
citizen to conduct a search.123 In Walther, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
applied such reasoning to the DEA's involvement with an informant airline em-
ployee to hold that the latter had acted as an agent of the government.1 24 "The
DEA either knew or should have known that [the informant] had made it a
practice to inspect [parcels], and had acquiesced in that practice."' 125 The court
did not require a subjective, fact-specific inquiry into the motives of the law
enforcement officers in order to attribute the actions of their informant to the
state. By applying the fourth amendment to objectively foreseeable intrusions
such as that in Walther, courts will send a message that will deter police action
that is tantamount to the intrusions the fourth amendment's framers sought to
proscribe.
Objective tests in the context of the fourth amendment are not without pre-
cedent. The United States Supreme Court has promulgated an objective stan-
dard for the determination of whether a brief stop of a citizen by an officer rises
121. Id
122. United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 904 (9th Cir. 1973). The court in Davis stated that:
[e]ven if the governmental involvement at some point in the period could be characterized
accurately as mere encouragement ... that involvement would nevertheless be "signifi-
cant" for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. Constitutional limitations on governmental
action would be severely undercut if the government were allowed to actively encourage
conduct by "private" persons or entities that is prohibited to the government itself.
Id.
123. Comment, supra note 115, at 170.
124. 652 F.2d 788, 793 (9th Cir. 1981).
125. Id.
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to the level of a fourth amendment seizure. In United States v. Mendenhall,126
Justice Stewart wrote that "a person has been 'seized' within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all the circumstances surrounding the
incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to
leave." 127 The Court later explained the advantages of such a test in Michigan v.
Chesternut.128
The test's objective standard-looking to the reasonable man's in-
terpretation of the conduct in question-allows the police to determine
in advance whether the conduct contemplated will implicate the
Fourth Amendment.... This "reasonable person" standard also en-
sures that the scope of the Fourth Amendment protection does not
vary with the state of mind of the particular individual. 129
The same virtues inhere in an objective test of agency in the context of a private
citizen search.
In United States v. Leon 130 the Court applied an objective test to determine
if the exclusionary rule was an appropriate remedy to a fourth amendment viola-
tion and held that the rule should not apply when officers have acted in objective
good faith on a warrant which is later found to be invalid. 131 The Court rea-
soned that "the magnitude of the benefit conferred on such guilty defendants [by
suppressing the evidence] offends basic concepts of the criminal justice sys-
tem." 132 In applying the proposed objective test to determine if the police
should have known that their actions would cause an individual to be subjected
to a search, a court would be judging the more fundamental question of whether
a constitutional violation had occurred in the first place. Surely it is no less
offensive that the police should be allowed to instigate a proscribed search
through subterfuge 133 than that courts should exclude admittedly unconstitu-
tionally obtained evidence where exclusion would have no deterrent utility.134
126. 446 U.S. 544 (1979).
127. Id. at 554. Justice Stewart was joined only by Justice Rehnquist in this portion of his
opinion. The objective test was later adopted by a majority of the Court. See California v. Hodari
D., 111 S. Ct. 1547, 1551 (1991); Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 573-74 (1988); INS v.
Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 215 (1984).
128. 486 U.S. 567 (1988).
129. Id. at 574 (citing 3 W. LAFAvE, supra note 6, § 9.2(h), at 407-08 (2d ed. 1987 & Supp.
1988)).
130. 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
131. Id. at 907.
132. Id. at 908 (citing Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 490 (1976)). Scholars have thoroughly
debated the merits of the Leon good-faith exception. Compare Dripps, Living With Leon, 95 YALE
L.J. 906 (1986) (concluding that the good-faith exception is entirely consistent with the fourth
amendment) with Duke, Making Leon Worse, 95 YALE L.J. 1405 (1986) (arguing that the good-faith
exception to suppressing evidence obtained through an invalid search warrant constitutes an impor-
tant, incremental step to "gutting" the exclusionary rule).
133. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
134. In Leon the Court asserted that the exclusionary rule "cannot be expected, and should not
be applied, to deter objectively reasonable law enforcement activity." Leon, 468 U.S. at 919 (empha-
sis added). A corollary to this statement is that it should be used to deter objectively unreasonable
police activity. To do so in the agency context, however, a court first must determine objectively if
the fourth amendment has been violated. Thus the subtle, subjective test for agency should be aban-
doned to maintain consistency with the Leon Court's fourth amendment jurisprudence.
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The Supreme Court also has applied an objective standard on police prac-
tices in the area of interrogation. In Rhode Island v. Innis,135 the issue was what
words or actions constitute "interrogation" for the purposes of applying Mi-
randa v. Arizona. 136 The Court held that, short of express questions asked of
the suspect, "words or actions on the part of the police... that the police should
know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response" are interroga-
tion.137 Therefore, statements so induced are subject to the exclusionary rule
under the fifth amendment. As in the application of the fourth amendment, the
Court in Innis used exclusion to deter proscribed police practices. 138 Identifying
a strength of the objective standard, the Court pointed out that the test provides
a measure of protection against coercive police practices without regard to
proofs of underlying intent. 139
The advantages of such an approach in characterizing interrogation prac-
tices also exist in characterizing the roots of a search. If a court determines that
an officer could not in good faith have been oblivious to the likelihood that her
actions would cause an intrusion upon a citizen, it should attribute the search so
caused to the officer herself.
It must be acknowledged that the tenor of the Leon decision indicates there
would be little judicial receptiveness to this suggestion. The Supreme Court ap-
plied the rationale in Leon specifically to limit the use of the exclusionary rule
for the very reason that when those perceived as criminals go free, there is signif-
icant damage to the credibility of the law.140 Yet Sanders will be cited often in
135. 446 U.S. 291, 293 (1980).
136. 384 U.S. 436, 444-45 (1967) (once a suspect has been taken into custody, statements made
in response to interrogation prior to her being advised of her fifth amendment right against self-
incrimination are inadmissible against her).
137. Innis, 446 U.S. at 301.
138. Id. at 299. The analogy between use of the exclusionary rule under fourth and fifth amend-
ment principles is rooted in the close nexus between the two amendments. Cf. Brown v. Illinois, 422
U.S. 590, 601 (1974) (the fourth and fifth amendments are in "intimate relation," and frequently
rights under the two amendments coalesce) (citing Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 633 (1886)),
It has been convincingly argued that the exclusionary rule has different purposes in the fourth
and fifth amendment contexts. See Loewy, Police-Obtained Evidence and the Constitution: Distin-
guishing Unconstitutionally Obtained Evidence from Unconstitutionally Used Evidence, 87 MICH. L.
REv. 907 (1987). In search and seizure cases the exclusionary rule should be invoked to deter police
practice that violates an individual's substantive fourth amendment right not to be searched or seized
unreasonably. Id. at 908-09. In contrast, the fifth amendment does not proscribe the act of ob-
taining the suspect's statement, only its use against him in criminal proceedings. When the exclu-
sionary rule is invoked to suppress evidence gained in violation of Miranda (a presumptive fifth
amendment violation), the court should be directly enforcing a procedural right, not acting to deter
the police practices. Id. at 916-17.
Under this reasoning, the analogy drawn here between the proposed objective test for agency in
fourth amendment cases and the good-faith test set forth in Innis is invalid. Courts do not recognize
consistently the foregoing distinction, however. Id. at 916. The Supreme Court in Innis stated that
its focus in formulating the good-faith test was to give effect to the Miranda safeguards which
"vest[ed] a suspect in custody with an added measure of protection against coercive police practices."
Innis, 446 U.S. at 301 (emphasis added). Thus, in deciding whether to apply the exclusionary rule,
the Innis Court created an objective test to accomplish a deterrent purpose.
139. Innis, 446 U.S. at 301.
140. See supra note 112. The Court also applied objective tests in both Mendenhall and Innis
with the result that the challenged evidence was admitted. In Mendenhall, the Court held that a
woman, who upon disembarking from a plane had been asked by officers for her ticket and identifica-
tion, had no objective reason to believe she was not free to go; therefore no seizure occured. United
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briefs opposing defendants' motions to suppress the fruits of a citizen's search as
an example of how far a court may go in finding no agency. One need only
recite the facts and note that the abhorrence of letting the defendant off on a
"technicality" ran so deep that the court ignored Brown's perjury before the fact
finder.
Courts need not deviate from settled precedent to apply the objective stan-
dard. They should continue to apply the test in which they look to official en-
couragement and the citizen's motivation. In determining whether those
elements amount to a governmental search, however, actions such as requesting
a search of some limited scope, offering to pay money, or providing detailed
information to facilitate the search should weigh more heavily toward an affirm-
ative finding. A police officer who engages in a pattern of such inducements
should reasonably foresee that his actions will be the cause of a search. If the
officer himself could not conduct that same foreseeable search, the courts should
not sanction the search by admitting the evidence just because the officer was
able to induce a private individual to do what he constitutionally could not.
ANTHONY G. SCHEER
States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 555 (1979). In Innis, two officers accompanying their suspect to
the police station lamented the possibility that children might find a shotgun used in the crime under
investigation. The Court held that the suspect's ensuing statement as to the location of the weapon
was admissible, since the interchange between the officers was not interrogation under the objective
test. Innis, 446 U.S. at 302-03; see supra note 139 and accompanying text.
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